The 2017 Grenfell Tower fire, which claimed 72 lives, is one of the most devastating and tragic disasters in recent British history. The publication of the final report from a six-year public inquiry into the fire sheds light on a complex web of failures and “systematic dishonesty” that spanned decades. These failures included government oversight, corporate misconduct and a lack of preparedness by the fire service. The report details how these elements contributed to the disaster, painting a chilling picture of how Grenfell became the scene of such a preventable tragedy.
Timeline of negligence: how did it happen?
The seeds of the Grenfell disaster were sown long before the fateful night of June 2017. The inquiry found the roots of the problem in the early 1990s, when fire safety in high-rise buildings in the UK began to be inadequately managed and regulated. It found that both Coalition and Conservative governments “ignored, delayed or disregarded” numerous warnings and concerns about unsafe practices in the construction and fire safety industries. This lack of action paved the way for a situation in which lives were needlessly put at risk.
For decades, experts have been warning about the dangers of using combustible cladding on tall buildings. Yet, repeatedly, opportunities to act were missed. A series of fires in the 1990s and 2000s highlighted the inherent risks, but government inaction and a drive to reduce regulatory “red tape” saw these warnings go unheeded. A key moment came after the fire at Lakanal House in south London in 2009. Despite the coroner’s recommendation for a review of building regulations, this was not considered with urgency and vital safety measures were not implemented.
Deadly refurbishment: the role of dishonest manufacturers
The refurbishment of Grenfell Tower in 2016, initially intended to improve the building’s aesthetics and insulation, became a catastrophic example of corporate misconduct and regulatory failure. At the heart of the disaster was the use of highly flammable polyethylene cladding, which enabled the fire to spread rapidly once it started. The inquiry found that “systematic dishonesty” by the manufacturers of both the cladding and the insulation materials was a key reason why such dangerous materials were chosen.
Three companies were singled out for their key role in the disaster: Arconic, Celotex and Kingspan. The inquiry’s findings showed that these companies deliberately manipulated testing procedures, misrepresented data and made false and misleading claims about the safety of their products. Arconic, which produced the Reynobond 55 cladding, concealed the true extent of the danger posed by its product, particularly when used as a folded cassette – a method widely used in the cladding industry. From 2005 until after the Grenfell fire, Arconic allowed customers to buy this dangerous product without disclosing its high risk.
Celotex, the manufacturer of the insulation used at Grenfell, also behaved similarly deceptively. The company was found to have presented its insulation as safe and suitable for use at Grenfell even though it knew it did not meet fire safety standards. It used non-combustible magnesium oxide board during tests to achieve better results, which it did not disclose in its marketing. Kingspan, another insulation manufacturer, “misled the market” by not disclosing the limitations of its product, which was also used on a part of Grenfell Tower.
Lack of accountability: the role of the council and management
The refurbishment of Grenfell Tower was overseen by the Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (TMO), responsible for managing social housing for the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC). The inquiry found that both the TMO and RBKC showed a “persistent indifference to fire safety”, particularly in relation to the safety of vulnerable residents. This indifference and lack of accountability was evident in the deterioration of the relationship between the TMO and residents, which was characterised by “distrust, dislike, personal antagonism and anger”.
The inquiry also criticised local authorities for failure to implement basic safety measures. For example, a project to replace fire doors at Grenfell Tower in 2011 resulted in doors that did not meet the required fire safety standards due to inadequate specifications. These fire doors, which were designed to withstand fire and smoke for at least 30 minutes to allow evacuation, were far from their intended purpose. Incompetence across the board: failure of architects, contractors and project managers
The companies and professionals involved in the rebuild project were also found to be at fault. Studio E, the architects responsible for the refurbishment design, failed to recognise the combustibility of the cladding and insulation